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I. Introduction
A church is made up of “many members, yet [is] one body.” 1
Unfortunately, the “members” do not always agree on how best to
direct the “body.” 2 Churches have an illustrious history of internal
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Washington and Lee University School of
Law; B.S., 2017, University of South Carolina. Thank you to Professor
Christopher Seaman for all of his advice throughout the Note-writing process.
Many thanks to my family who support me in all that I do.
1. 1 Corinthians 12:12 (New King James Version).
2. See infra Part II (detailing church polity disagreements leading to church
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disagreements over religious doctrine. 3 In recent decades, the
disputes shifted towards emerging social issues, such as the
ordination of women and same-sex sex marriage. 4 As society shifts
its opinions on such issues, so do members of church congregations.
In February 2019, the United Methodist Churchthe second
largest Protestant church in the United Statesvoted to reject a
proposal that would allow the ordination and marriage of LGBTQ
individuals. 5 The same debate occurred in the Presbyterian and
Episcopalian churches and led to countless lawsuits when the
churches approved inclusive measures concerning the LGBTQ
population. 6 In a national church with millions of members, such
social polity decisions can fracture a church beyond repair. 7

property disputes).
3. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344
U.S. 94, 100−04 (1952) (seeing a church split from its “mother” church in Russia
over political and religious differences); see also HENRY GARLAND & MARY
GARLAND, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO GERMAN LITERATURE 271 (2005) (describing
the 95 Theses nailed to Wittenberg Church in 1517 by Martin Luther in protest
over the church’s indulgences practice); Acts 15:1−21 (New King James Version)
(providing an account of an early religious dispute between the Pharisees and
Gentiles).
4. See Joe Carter, How to Tell the Difference Between the PCA and PCUSA,
COALITION
(June
23,
2014),
GOSPEL
https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/how-to-tell-the-difference-betweenthe-pca-and-pcusa/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (detailing PCA’s objection to
ordaining women for ministry that led to its separation from PCUSA) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See Timothy Williams and Elizabeth Dias, United Methodists Tighten
Ban on Same-Sex Marriage and Gay Clergy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/us/united-methodists-vote.html?smid=fbnytimes&smtyp=cur&fbclid=IwAR0i8OvPo7XzJ8WEtfki97D3z4udrurVH5DCpDPFdS1VFG39tPshgS-SzE (last visited Sept. 23, 2019)
(rejecting a proposal that would see the seven million members of the United
Methodist Church allowing gay marriage and LGBTQ clergy) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See id. (noting that Presbyterian and Episcopalian churches lost
conservative members over the approval of same-sex marriage).
7. See Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Presbyterian Church (USA) Changes Its
Constitution to Include Gay Marriage, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/03/17/presbyterianchurch-changes-constitution-to-include-gay-marriage/?utm_term=.bc3a459cdb63
(last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (stating that the PCUSA has lost 37% of its national
membership since 1992 over social issue disputes) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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A church divided over social issues often sees an outflux of
members and the creation of complex property disputes. 8 When
churches are divided, congregations often split along polity lines,
with one sect remaining loyal to the national church, and one sect
leaving the denomination. 9 Almost immediately, disputes arise
over ownership of church propertymost commonly the building. 10
Just as important to a congregation, however, is the church’s
name. As organizations dependent on congregant tithes and
community reputation, churches often trademark their names and
symbols to safeguard their goodwill. 11 The fight over exclusive use
to a church’s name is complex and full of uncertainty. This
complexity is illustrated through a 2017 lawsuit involving a schism
in the Episcopal Church. 12
The Episcopal Church’s presence in South Carolina dates back
to 1789. 13 The current form of the Lower Diocese of South Carolina
was incorporated in 1973 with the purpose “to continue an
Episcopal Diocese under the Constitution and Canons of [t]he
Episcopal Church.” 14 The national Episcopal Church’s move to
ordain those identifying as LGBTQ caused a nationwide schism, 15
8. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 90
(S.C. 2017) (detailing a property dispute resulting from a church decision over
LGBTQ clergy and same-sex marriage).
9. See Bailey, supra note 7 (finding the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. split
over same-sex marriage).
10. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 598 (1979) (arguing over exclusive
ownership of real property that stemmed from a doctrinal disagreement); Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 721 (1872) (disputing real property ownership after the
church’s split over slavery).
11. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 987 (4th Cir. 1944) (noting the
goodwill imbedded in a church’s name).
12. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 91 (finding the severed
church seeking exclusive ownership over real and intellectual property). The
Episcopal Church will be noted as “TEC” in various quotations from court
opinions throughout this Note.
13. See id. at 85 (describing the church’s formation in South Carolina).
14. See id. at 85−86 (“TEC is an unincorporated association comprised of
subunits known as dioceses. Each diocese is, in turn, comprised of congregations
known as parishes or missions.”).
15. See id. at 90 n.8 (noting the dispute began when the General Convention
confirmed the first openly homosexual bishop); see also Rev. Canon Dr. Kendall
S. Harmon, Diocese Releases Statement Regarding Disassociation from the
Episcopal Church, DIOCESE OF S.C., https://www.dioceseofsc.org/newsevents/legal-news/diocese-releases-statement-regarding-disassociation-
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and resulted in the Lower Diocese of South Carolina breaking
away from the national Episcopal Church and joining the Anglican
Church. 16 The dissociated Lower Diocese filed suit in 2013 seeking
a declaration that it was “the true Diocese in the lower part of
South Carolina, [and] that all property at issue belonged to that
faction.” 17
Under the United States Supreme Court’s neutral principles
framework, courts may not undertake judicial review of
ecclesiastical matters, including disputes resulting from
differences in doctrine, polity, or governance. 18 In the 2017
Episcopal Church decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the claim at issue concerned ecclesiastical matters of
church polity and governance, and, thus, under the neutral
principles approach gave deference to the national Episcopal
Church. 19 The decision meant that the disassociated Diocese lost
access to real property previously held by the local church for
generations. 20
In the same decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the dissociated Diocese’s state trademarks, which included
reference to “Episcopal” in the Lower Diocese’s name, were to be
cancelled in favor of the national Episcopal Church’s federal
marks. 21 The South Carolina Supreme Court made this decision
without reference to the U.S. Supreme Court’s neutral principles

episcopal-church/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (disapproving of the national
Episcopal Church’s acceptance of same-sex marriage) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See Diocese’s Petition for Cert Denied by US Supreme Court, DIOCESE OF
S.C. (June 11, 2018), https://www.dioceseofsc.org/dioceses-petition-for-certdenied-by-us-supreme-court/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (noting the Diocese as a
member of the Anglican Church in North America) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
17. Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 91.
18. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602−03 (describing the advantages of a neutral
principles approach).
19. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82,
92−93 (S.C. 2017) (confirming the highest church tribunal’s decision which
granted real property to the national church).
20. See id. at 85 (noting the lengthy history of the congregation in South
Carolina).
21. See id. at 92 (deciding the trademark dispute in favor of the national
Episcopal Church).
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approach. 22 In the end, the churches were left in uncertain
territory, as the South Carolina Supreme Court’s order was
virtually unenforceable without further lower court action. 23 The
South Carolina court removed itself from the real property dispute,
yet felt it proper to adjudicate the trademark claim. 24 Why the
difference in approach? The difference likely stems from the
Supreme Court’s lack of jurisprudence on the intersection between
free exercise and trademarks. 25
The United States was founded in part on the principle of
freedom of religionfree from religious preferencewhere citizens
were free to practice any religion. 26 The founding fathers felt so
strongly about this principle that it was incorporated into the First
Amendment. 27 The Free Exercise Clause states that, “Congress
22. See id. (applying state and federal trademark law without reference to
common law neutral principles).
23. See vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, No. 2:13-587-RMG, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 143513, at *4−5 (D.S.C. Aug. 23, 2018) (continuing the conflict over the
service marks in the District of South Carolina); see also Andrew Knapp, U.S.
Supreme Court declines review of Episcopal property dispute from South Carolina,
POST & COURIER (June 11, 2018), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/ussupreme-court-declines-review-of-episcopal-property-disputefrom/article_372580c4-6d7a-11e8-9f32-6ba48799a28f.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2019) (“The breakaway diocese contended the conflicted nature of the state
Supreme Court ruling ‘is virtually unenforceable.’”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
24. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 92−93 (holding that court
involvement in the real property case was improper, while deciding the
trademark claim).
25. The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari on such issues. See
Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area v. Eden Prairie Presbyterian Church, Inc.,
2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 375, review denied, 2017 Minn. LEXIS 444 (July
18, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2619 (June 11, 2018); Protestant Episcopal
Church, 806 S.E.2d 82 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018).
26. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States of
America and the Bey and Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary, Tripoli−U.S., Nov. 4,
1796, art. XI, 8 Stat. 154 (“[T]he government of the United States of America is
not in any sense founded on the Christian Religionas it has in itself no character
of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of Musselmen . . . .”); Letter
from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT AND A FREE SOCIETY,
465−66 (Adrienne Koch ed., George Braziller Press 1965) (“Every new &
successful example therefore of a perfect separation between ecclesiastical and
civil matters, is of importance . . . religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity,
the less they are mixed together.”).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 28
The Supreme Court later adopted the neutral principles approach
to avoid Free Exercise violations resulting from courts deciding
real property disputes. 29 Without the application of the same
neutral principles to intellectual property disputes between
churches, however, there is real danger of violating the Free
Exercise Clause. 30 This Note seeks to answer the question: Does
the government’s role in approving and enforcing trademark rights
in intra-church disputes violate the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment? 31
The rest of this Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides an
overview of Supreme Court church property jurisprudence and
describes the evolution of the neutral principles approach. This
Note primarily focuses on property disputes between hierarchical
churches, as their governing structure leaves them most
vulnerable to Free Exercise implications. Part III outlines how an
entity, secular or religious, registers a trademark with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The section details
infringement actions and provides examples of registered church
trademarks. Part IV concerns the constitutional implications of
church trademark adjudication, specifically through the lens of the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Part IV.A
concludes that the USPTO’s registering of church trademarks does
not violate the Establishment Clause. Part IV.B analyzes Free
Exercise implications concerning the adjudication of trademark
infringement suits. Because of the neutral principles approach and
the inherently ecclesiastical nature of church trademarks, Part
IV.B concludes that current court action violates the Free Exercise
Clause. Part V suggests that courts should uniformly apply the
neutral principles approach to real and intellectual property
28. Id.
29. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (stating that courts have no role
in determining ecclesiastical questions when dealing with property disputes).
30. See Brief of the Falls Church Anglican and the American Anglican
Council as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Protestant Episcopal
Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 2017) (No. 17-1136) (noting the
conflict and uncertainty resulting from competing interpretations of the neutral
principles approach).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
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disputes alike. This section theorizes that such an approach would
prevent future Free Exercise violations.
II. Supreme Court Church Property Jurisprudence
Religious schisms giving rise to property disputes are nothing
new. 32 Most commonly, the disputes are caused by all, or part, of a
local congregation disagreeing with the doctrinal changes of the
national church, causing the local church to split from its
denomination. 33 These cases typically involve a division of
members into distinct factions, usually two, with each claiming the
exclusive use of the property held and owned by that local church. 34
Religious congregations often have strong attachments to church
property, most commonly the church building. 35 One such case saw
leaders in the Lower Diocese of South Carolina seeking to leave
The Episcopal Church over a doctrinal disagreement, while
preserving the right to church property, including the
congregation’s place of worship. 36
The intermingling of property and religious issues led the
Supreme Court to first intercede in church property disputes
32. See Episcopal Church v. Salazar, 547 S.W.3d 353, 360−61 (Tex. App.
2018) (noting that the Episcopal Church was founded in 1789 after it broke from
the Church of England).
33. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 981−83 (4th Cir. 1944) (seeing
those opposed to a church merger leave the church and seek to retain use of the
church property and name); Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of
Christ v. Evans, 520 A.2d 1347, 1349−51 (N.J. 1987) (adjudicating use of the name
“Christian Science” between a break-off faction and the original church);
Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 84−86 (S.C.
2017) (finding the majority of a local church leaving the national Episcopal
Church).
34. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 720−21 (1872) (stating that slavery
was the source of conflict between the two religious factions).
35. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting cases where the church
property suit centered on control of the church building); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 95−96 (1952) (finding the
church wanting to occupy its building in New York after leaving the international
church).
36. See
Protestant
Episcopal
Church,
806
S.E.2d
at
91
(“Respondents . . . [seek] a declaration that respondent Disassociated Diocese was
the true Diocese in the lower part of South Carolina, that all property at issue
belonged to that faction.”).
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almost 150 years ago. 37 The Court expressed the importance of
strict adherence to the Free Exercise Clause, saying, “Ours is a
government which by the ‘law of its being’ allows no statute, state
or national, that prohibits the free exercise of religion. There are
occasions when civil courts must draw lines between the
responsibilities of church and state for the disposition or use of
property.” 38 The Court recognized that history is full of examples
showcasing governmental involvement in religious disputes,
stressing the danger that comes with adjudicating religious
conflicts. 39
Before adjudicating a church property claim, courts must first
determine the religious organization’s structure. 40 Churches can
have one of two organizational structures: hierarchical 41 or
congregational. 42 Hierarchical organization of a religious
institution complicates intra-church property disputes because of
the presence of a high church tribunal. 43 When religious disputes
37. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 729 (“It is of the essence of these religious unions,
and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among
themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical
cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.”).
38. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120 (1952) (concerning the right to use and
occupy a church building in New York City).
39. See id. at 124−25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The long, unedifying
history of the contest between the secular state and the church is replete with
instances of attempts by civil government to exert pressure upon religious
authority.”); see also John E. Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms:
Who is the Church?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 319, 324−25 (1997) (discussing Justice
Frankfurter’s recognition of the dangers of court involvement in religious
disputes).
40. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979) (finding that hierarchical
church structures, like the church at issue, mandates deferral to the authoritative
tribunal of the church).
41. See id. at 599 (noting that the local church property is held in trust for
the general church and was, therefore, hierarchical).
42. See First Indep. Missionary Baptist Church v. McMillan, 153 So. 2d 337,
340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (“Where a church is . . . strictly
congregational . . . its rights to the use of the property must be determined by the
ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations.”).
43. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708−09
(1976) (noting that where analysis involves “religious law and polity,
the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not
disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of
hierarchical polity”). The “Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Holy Synod of the
Serbian Orthodox Church (Mother Church)” is the highest ecclesiastical tribunal.
Id. at 697. The tribunal makes religious polity decisions for all churches under
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are subject to final judgment under a church tribunal, the ruling
stands for all lower churches within the denomination. 44 However,
if the church is congregational, the dispute is easily solved, as the
local church retains greater autonomy and holds the property
independently. 45
Crucial to adjudicating such disputes is the principle that the
court cannot involve itself in any “consideration of doctrinal
matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of
faith.” 46 Courts employ a two-step framework for adjudicating real
property disputes. 47 Over time, this framework has evolved into
the modern neutral principles approach. 48
First, the court must decide if the dispute requires the trier of
fact to look into doctrinal issues, such as church governance or
ideology of the adverse factions, as opposed to basic property
issues, such as examining the title owner. 49 Doctrinal matters
often stem from the national church attempting to respond to
societal changes and political movements, which the local church
resists. 50 There must be “no inquiry into the existing religious
the Mother Church. Id. at 708.
44. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969) (noting the right for churches to
establish their own high tribunals).
45. See First Indep. Missionary Baptist Church, 153 So. 2d at 340 (describing
the application of ordinary law to solve congregational real property disputes).
Because of this more straightforward application, congregational churches are
not the focus of this Note. Unless otherwise noted, the religious organizations in
this Note are hierarchical.
46. Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God, Inc., 396 U.S.
367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605−08 (declaring that courts may either (1) defer
to high church tribunals, or (2) apply neutral principles).
48. See id. at 599−604 (warning that neutral principles is not appropriate if
the analysis “would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy”).
49. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at
449 (noting the danger of adjudicating a church property dispute involving
doctrinal issues).
50. See id. at 442 n.1 (detailing the controversy that erupted when the
Presbyterian Church endorsed women’s ordination, opposed the Vietnam War,
and supported the removal of prayer from public schools); Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. 679, 690−91 (1979) (describing the church dispute over slavery); Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 100−06 (1952)
(detailing the Cold War-era split between a New York Russian Orthodox church
and the Russian mother church).
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opinions . . . for, if such was permitted, a very small
minority, . . . might be found to be the only faithful supporters of
the religious dogmas of the founders of the church.”51 Where the
case requires doctrinal involvement, the court must yield and defer
to the highest church authority. 52 Deference absolves the court of
involvement in the matter. 53
Second, assuming doctrinal issues are not at play and
deference is not required, the court must apply neutral principles
of law to adjudicate the real property dispute. 54 The neutral
principles approach “is completely secular in operation, and yet
flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization
and polity.” 55 The approach is constitutional because it applies the
law objectively, and absolves courts from involvement in religious
polity disputes. 56 Neutral principles also involves examining
property deeds, relevant state statutes dealing with implied trusts,
and church legal documents or contracts signed between the local
and general church to determine property ownership. 57
Put simply, neutral principles first requires the court to
determine if there is a doctrinal issue at play in the suit. 58 If
doctrinal issues are present, then the highest court tribunal
resolves the claim. 59 If the claim is free from doctrinal
entanglement, the court is free to adjudicate the issue using
51. Watson, 80 U.S. at 725.
52. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (stating that courts are
required to defer to ecclesiastical bodies when questions of religious doctrine or
polity are involved).
53. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 724−25 (noting that when
deference is exercised “the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their
decisions as binding upon them”).
54. See Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d
1244, 1249−50 (9th Cir. 1999) (listing the advantages of the neutral principles
approach).
55. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603.
56. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 332 (commenting on the Court’s
reasoning in Wolf for adopting neutral principles).
57. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 600, 602−03 (noting that the neutral principles
approach is “consistent with the Constitution”).
58. See id. at 607 (stating that the question of which church faction
represents the “true congregation” cannot be answered by the court).
59. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 727 (recognizing the church tribunal’s ultimate
authority concerning ecclesiastical matters).
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objective law. 60 A summary of the approach is seen in the following
figure.

Figure 1 61

60. See Presbyterian Church in U.S v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“Civil courts do not inhibit free
exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church
property.”).
61. See Episcopal Church v. Salazar, 547 S.W.3d 353, 409 (Tex. App. 2018)
(depicting the analytical process used by courts in adjudicating real property
disputes with a neutral principles approach).
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The Supreme Court applied neutral principles in Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church. 62 The dispute
centered around the right to use and occupy the St. Nicholas
Cathedral in New York City, which was religiously affiliated with
the Russian Orthodox Church. 63 The archbishop of the American
churches, chosen by an American ecclesiastical committee, sought
a corporate right to exclusively occupy the cathedral. 64 The then
possessors of the Cathedral, led by the archbishop appointed by the
Patriarch in Moscow, Russia, opposed this act. 65 Determination of
the right to use and occupy the cathedral depended on which
archbishop appointment, the American or Russian, was valid. 66
Applying neutral principles, the Court first determined that
the issue of church leadership was an ecclesiastical one. 67 Because
the ecclesiastical head in Moscow retained power over the
American churches, its appointment of the archbishop was
considered valid. 68 While the dispute stemmed from the right to
control real property, the Court recognized the underlying issue of
church governance and properly applied neutral principles, which
mandated deferral to the highest church tribunal. 69
Yet, even though the Supreme Court adopted neutral
principles, 70 state courts do not apply it uniformly. 71 This may
62. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
63. See id. at 95−97 (emphasizing the long connection between the local N.Y.
congregation and its Russian counterparts).
64. See id. at 96 (stating that Archbishop Leonty, the head of all North
American and Canadian churches, was appointed by an American ecclesiastical
body).
65. See id. (discussing Archbishop Fedchenkoff’s appointment by the
ecclesiastical leaders in Moscow).
66. See id. at 96−97 (recognizing the potential constitutional issues in
examining church governance issues).
67. See id. at 115 (noting that “the power of the Supreme Church Authority
of the Russian Orthodox Church to appoint the ruling hierarch of the archdiocese
of North America” was ecclesiastical).
68. See id. at 120 (finding no relinquishment of “power by the Russian
Orthodox Church”).
69. See id. at 120−21 (“Even in those cases when the property right follows
as an incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues,
the church rule controls.”).
70. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (adopting the neutral
principles approach for its flexible, non-intrusive manner).
71. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 335−53 (noting four states’ rejections of
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stem from the Court’s own inner turmoil over the approach. 72 The
addition of intra-church trademark disputes further complicates
neutral principles. Because the Supreme Court has yet to speak on
this specific issue, 73 lower courts left to their own devices produce
inconsistent results. 74
Even with the uncertainties surrounding church property
adjudication, the Supreme Court envisioned a process as free from
governmental involvement as possible. 75
III. Trademarks Within the Religious Context
Trademarks and their precursors have been protected at
common law and in equity since the founding of the United
States. 76 Underlying trademark law is the principle that
distinctive marks should be afforded protection to distinguish a
particular good or service from others. 77 Courts recognize that, like
secular entities, religious organizations should be protected by the
“the common law principles of unfair competition.” 78 In the

the neutral principles approach and eight states’ application of it).
72. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 610−14 (warning that neutral principles may
increase government involvement in church disputes); see also Fennelly, supra
note 39, at 332 (discussing the four Justice dissent in Wolf that questioned the
practicality of the neutral principles approach).
73. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82
(S.C. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-1136, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3624 (U.S. June 11, 2018)
(denying certiorari on a church property dispute involving intra-church
trademark components).
74. See infra note 191 (detailing cases in which courts reach varying results).
75. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“[T]he First Amendment severely
circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property
disputes.”).
76. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (summarizing the history
of American trademark law (citing 3 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 19:8 (4th ed. 2017))).
77. See id. at 1751−52 (discussing how trademarks help consumers make
purchasing decisions).
78. Okla. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Okla. v. New Hope
Assembly of God Church of Norman, 597 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Okla. 1979); see also
Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 987−88 (4th Cir. 1944) (protecting the merged
majority faction from infringement by the minority).
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religious context, churches use trademarks to promote their
unique identities amongst a sea of similar organizations. 79
Along with the protection afforded by a registered trademark,
the marks serve as source identifiers to the public. 80 In Matal v.
Tam, 81 the Supreme Court evaluated a band name’s proposed
trademark and noted that the trademark would not only identify
the band but would also serve to express a view about social
issues. 82 The power of trademarks to convey such messages makes
them especially important to religious entities. 83
The Lanham Act establishes the regulatory framework for all
entities seeking trademark protection for goods and services. 84
Religious and secular organizations are equally eligible to register
and receive protection for their trademarks, 85 so long as their mark
satisfies the necessary elements. 86 As of November 2018, the
USPTO lists more than 1,000 trademarks including the word
“church.” 87
79. See Purcell, 145 F.2d at 985 (“[W]hile [churches] exist for the worship of
Almighty God . . . they are nevertheless dependent upon the contributions of their
members for means to carry on their work.”).
80. See Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v.
Robinson, 115 F. Supp. 2d 607, 610 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (noting that the trademark
“Seventh-Day Adventist” identified “the Mother Church as the source of products
and services”).
81. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
82. See id. at 1764 (granting the trademark under provisions of the Lanham
Act).
83. See Purcell, 145 F.2d at 983 (“The name of this church, . . . was of great
value, not only because business was carried on and property held in that name,
but also because millions of members associated with the name the most sacred
of their personal relationships and the holiest of their family traditions.”).
84. See Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (outlining the
components necessary for federal trademark protection).
85. See Purcell, 145 F.2d at 985 (noting that non-secular organizations are
eligible for trademark protection); Nat’l Bd. of YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615,
621 (D.S.C. 1971) (stating that “a religious . . . organization is entitled to protect
the use of its name against those who secede”).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (detailing application requirements for registration
of trademarks with the Patent and Trademark Office); see also Trademark
Manual
of
Examining
Procedure,
U.S.P.T.O.
(Oct.
2018),
https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current (last visited Sept. 23, 2019)
(“[O]utlines the procedures which Examining Attorneys are required or
authorized to follow in the examination of trademark applications.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See Paul Tarr, What the 2nd Circ. Missed in Religious Trademark Case,
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The Lanham Act first requires that the mark be used in
commerce. 88 Trademarks used by members of a collective
organization, known as collective marks, satisfy the “for use in
commerce” requirement. 89 Collective marks, such as a church’s
name or symbol, 90 are used to indicate membership. 91 Collective
marks are also trademarkable, subject to Section 1052 of the
Lanham Act, which states that marks must be distinctive so as not
to cause confusion, mistake or deception. 92 Church trademark
infringement actions are most frequently brought under this
provision of the Act. 93
Religious marks often come under scrutiny when faced with
the distinctiveness requirement of § 1052 because their marks are
often labeled as generic. 94 Church trademarks are deemed generic
if they merely state the denomination, such as “Assembly of God.” 95
Law 360 (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1101356/what-the2nd-circ-missed-in-religious-trademark-case (last visited Sept. 23, 2019)
(detailing the advantages of churches obtaining trademarks, including the ability
to protect their “spiritual message”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “use in commerce” as a bona fide use of
the mark in the ordinary course of trade).
89. See id. §§ 1127, 1154 (stating that collective marks are registrable under
the same requirements as trademarks).
90. See, e.g., Nat’l Bd. of YWCA, 35 F. Supp. at 619 (noting plaintiff’s five
registered marks, indicating membership in the Young Women’s Christian
Association).
91. See MICHAEL J. SCHWAB, ACQUIRING TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND
REGISTRATIONS (West 2019) (defining collective marks as used to distinguish
goods and services of members from those of non-members).
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (detailing requirements for trademark
protection).
93. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402,
404−05 (6th Cir. 2010) (deciding a trademark infringement suit based on McGill's
use of protected marks in advertising of his breakaway church); Nat’l Bd. of
YWCA, 35 F. Supp. at 629 (upholding an infringement claim for the use of the
trademark “Young Women's Christian Association”).
94. See Okla. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Okla. v. New Hope
Assembly of God Church of Norman, 597 P.2d 1211, 1213−15 (Okla. 1979)
(attacking the validity of trademark for “Assembly of God” on grounds it is
generic); see also Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 988 (4th Cir. 1944) (noting
that while the word “Methodist” is generic, the church’s name in whole was not).
95. See Okla. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Okla., 597 P.2d at
1213 (“‘Assembly of God’”. . . is a generic or descriptive term having no specific
relationship to any body or group but having a wide and broad application to those
people who assemble to do God's work as they see it.”).
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A generic name is not entitled to legal protection because it is
merely “descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities,
ingredients, or characteristics.” 96 The Southern District of New
York described the difference between a generic mark and a valid
distinctive one, stating, “[A] generic mark is one that answers the
question ‘What are you?’ while a valid trademark answers ‘Who
are you?’” 97
Because generic names are so commonly used, giving only one
entity the exclusive rights to a generic term creates a monopoly. 98
In Oklahoma Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Oklahoma
v. New Hope Assembly of God Church of Norman, 99 the court
decided that the term “Assembly of God” was generic and lacked
secondary meaning outside of identifying the church
denomination, precluding it from trademark protection. 100
Analyzing the church name for potential trademark protection is
complex, and often leaves courts divided over whether similar
marks are generic. 101
Once a religious entity satisfies all trademark elements, the
mark is entitled to trademark registration with the USPTO. 102
96. Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 54 (1880). See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)
(disallowing trademark protection for marks that are merely descriptive);
Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Evans, 105 N.J. 297,
309 (1987) (noting that a secondary meaning, “no matter how strong, can never
earn trademark status for a generic word or phrase”).
97. See Universal Church, Inc. v. Universal Life Church/ULC Monastery,
No. 14Civ.5213(NRB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127362, at *12, *15−18 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 8, 2017) (deciding that the term “Universal Church” was generic); Universal
Church, Inc. v. Toellner, No. 17-2960-cv, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31153, at *2−4
(2d Cir. Nov. 2, 2018) (same).
98. See Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Evans, 105
N.J. 297, 306−07 (1987) (deciding that “Christian Science” was generic, and that
granting the Church exclusive use to the term would preclude others from rightful
use).
99. 597 P.2d 1211 (Okla. 1979).
100. See id. at 1214−15 (denying trademark protection for “Assembly of God”
because it was deemed generic).
101. Compare Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ,
Scientist v. Robinson, 115 F. Supp. 2d 607, 610−11 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (deciding that
the church name “Christian Science” was not generic), with Christian Sci. Bd. of
Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Evans, 105 N.J. 297, 307−08 (1987) (deciding
that the church name “Christian Science” was generic).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (“A person who has a bona fide intention,
under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use a trademark
in commerce may request registration of its trademark . . . .”); see also id. § 1127
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While registration is not mandatory to obtain legal protection, 103 it
is highly recommended since it serves as constructive notice of the
“registrant’s claim of ownership” of the mark. 104 USPTO agents
review each trademark application individually without an inquiry
into the viewpoint of the mark. 105
The USPTO has made it clear, however, that registration of a
mark does not indicate the government’s approval of the mark, 106
and the Supreme Court has indicated that trademarks are not a
form of government speech. 107 Government neutrality in
registering trademarks is key to Establishment Clause
compliance. 108
Registration of a trademark is especially useful in cases of
trademark infringement 109 because it serves as prima facie
evidence of one’s exclusive legal right to the mark. 110 In church
disputes, long-standing registration is used to preclude
break-away factions from gaining access to the marks. 111 The
(defining person as including “the United States, any agency or instrumentality
thereof, or any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and
with the authorization and consent of the United States”).
103. See id. § 1125(c)(6) (providing remedies for trademark infringement
without prior trademark registration).
104. See id. § 1072 (“Registration of a mark on the principal register . . . shall
be constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof.”); see also
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752−53 (2017) (noting the advantages of
registering a trademark with the USPTO).
105. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758 (“[I]f the mark meets the Lanham Act’s
viewpoint−neutral requirements, registration is mandatory.”).
106. See id. at 1759 (finding the Court clarifying that “issuance of a trademark
registration . . . is not a government imprimatur” (citing In re Old Glory Condom
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1220 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 1993))).
107. See id. at 1758 (“If the federal registration of a trademark makes the
mark government speech . . . [i]t is saying many unseemly things. . . . It is
expressing contradictory views. It is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of
commercial products and services.”).
108. See infra notes 125–130 and accompanying text (discussing the neutral
registration of trademarks, which avoids Establishment Clause implications).
109. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1301 (2015)
(“The owner of a mark, whether registered or not, can bring suit in federal court
if another is using a mark that too closely resembles the plaintiff’s.”).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6) (“The ownership by a person of a valid
registration under . . . the principal register under this Act shall be a complete
bar to an action against that person.”).
111. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402,
405 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting the church has registered marks “Seventh-day
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registration of trademarks is fairly straightforward thanks to the
clear procedures set out in the Lanham Act. 112 However, since a
church’s association with its names and marks often pre-dates the
Lanham Act by many years, early common law trademarks often
do not fit neatly into the Act’s framework. 113
IV. Constitutional Implications of Church Trademark
Adjudication
When an entity alleges trademark infringement, courts apply
the Lanham Act to determine if the legal rights to a mark have
been violated, and if so, to determine the appropriate remedy for
the violation. 114 The matter is complicated when non-secular
entities are on both sides of a trademark infringement suit. 115
Because of the long history of separation of church and state in the
United States, courts are wary to wade into religious matters. 116
The First Amendment provides religious freedoms and
protections, stating that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
Adventist,” “Adventist,” and “General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists”);
Nat’l Bd. of YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615, 619−20 (D.S.C. 1971) (detailing
the YWCA’s five registered trademarks, including “Young Women’s Christian
Association”); Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82,
92 (S.C. 2017) (noting the federally registered trademarks held by the national
church“The Episcopal Church” and “The Protestant Episcopal Church in the
United States of America”which took precedence over state trademarks
obtained by the local church).
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (describing the procedures for the registration of
trademarks).
113. See Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (noting
religious organizations are entitled to trade name protection in a decision decided
before the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946).
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (noting remedies and infringement
procedures).
115. See infra notes 191, 197, 198 and accompanying text (describing the
challenges of church trademark adjudication).
116. See Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S. Under the
Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the
U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 837, 846 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When a district judge takes sides in
a religious schism, purports to decide matters of spiritual succession, and
excludes dissenters from using the name, symbols, and marks of the faith . . . the
First Amendment line appears to have been crossed.”).
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thereof . . . .” 117 The Establishment Clause prevents the state from
supporting or declaring a religion, 118 while the Free Exercise
Clause 119 gives citizens the “right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires” without state interference. 120
A. The Establishment Clause
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is far from clear, 121 but
there is a general consensus among courts that the Clause is not
violated when churches are granted trademarks. 122 The U.S.
District Court of South Carolina summarized the issue well, saying
[T]his Court does not believe that the First
Amendment prohibits the United States Patent Office
from granting a trademark to the plaintiff or to any other
religious organization . . . . Such registration by the

117. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
118. Id.; see also Jed Silversmith & Jack Guggenheim, Between Heaven and
Earth: The Interrelationship Between Intellectual Property and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 467, 470 (2001) (describing the
role of the Establishment Clause in religious jurisprudence).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
120. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
121. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (describing a
three-prong test for determining if state action violates the First Amendment);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825−26 (1995)
(proscribing that a statute is valid under the Establishment Clause if it is applied
in an impartial manner). Courts inconsistently apply Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Clause is “unsatisfying.”
See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, ET. AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 276−79
(2002) (noting the inconsistencies amongst courts in the Establishment Clause
arena).
122. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402,
405−08 (6th Cir. 2010) (confirming the validity of the church’s federal trademark),
Nat’l Bd. of the YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615, 624−25 (D.S.C. 1971)
(“Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a religious organization from owning
propertyand a trademark is a property rightor prohibits the government from
protecting that property from unlawful appropriation by others.”); Protestant
Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 92 (S.C. 2017) (stating the
validity of the national church’s federal trademarks); Lutheran Free Church v.
Lutheran Free Church, 141 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Minn. 1966) (affirming a majority
faction’s ownership of the church’s trademark).
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Patent Office is . . . analogous to a state granting a charter
to a church or to a religious institution. 123
It is well-established that exclusive rights to trademark names
may be given to businesses, including “charitable, religious and
other societies.” 124 Trademarks are granted to churches, just like
corporations and secular entities, to protect against the use of one’s
identity or a similar name that would cause confusion for the
general public. 125
The USPTO grants trademarks without any regard to a
religious organization’s doctrine. 126 Trademarks are issued based
on a set of definitive criteria that are evaluated in the same
manner for secular and religious entities. 127 USPTO examiners,
barring circumstances not at issue in this Note, 128 are not
permitted to inquire “whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark
123. Nat’l Bd. of the YWCA, 335 F. Supp. at 624−25.
124. Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921); see also
Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 985 (4th Cir. 1944) (“[A] benevolent, fraternal,
or social organization will be protected in the use of its name by injunction . . . .”
(citing NIMS ON UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS (3d ed.) § 86; THOMPSON
ON CORPORATIONS (3d ed.) § 77)).
125. See Purcell, 145 F.2d at 987 (“Men have the right to worship God
according to the dictates of conscience; but they have no right in doing so to make
use of a name which will enable them to appropriate the good will which has been
built up by an organization . . . .”); see also Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Right
of Charitable or Religious Association or Corporation to Protection Against Use of
Same or Similar Name by Another, 37 A.L.R.3d 277 (2018) (noting that churches
should be protected from unfair competition, but that “courts in a few of the cases
herein have suggested that such rules ought not to be applied with the same
strictness”).
126. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017) (noting that the Lanham
Act does not generally allow for inquiry into a trademark’s viewpoint, and that
registration is mandatory if all necessary elements are complied with); 1 GILSON
ON TRADEMARKS § 3.04 (2018) (describing the application and approval process for
obtaining a trademark through the USPTO).
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (listing criteria for registration of
trademarks, such as exclusivity and use in commerce).
128. The only instance where USPTO examiners are permitted to inquire into
the viewpoint of the trademark is where Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is
implicated. See id. § 1052(a) (“Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage . . . institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”). Matal involved a
dispute of this sort. 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (holding the disparagement clause of the
Lanham Act unconstitutional). See also In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1341 (9th
Cir. 2017), cert. granted, Iancu v. Brunetti, 202 L. Ed. 2d 510 (2019) (questioning
the constitutionality of the “immoral or scandalous” clause of the Lanham Act).
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is consistent with Government policy or whether any such
viewpoint is consistent with that expressed by other marks already
on the principal register.” 129 Additionally, federal registration of
trademarks does not constitute approval of the mark’s content or
message on the government’s behalf. 130 A trademark simply
indicates exclusive legal ownership in the eyes of the
government. 131
Because courts apply trademark law to religious organizations
the same as they do to all other entities, state action granting
churches trademarks does not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause. 132 Trademark laws are secular in purpose. 133 Just as
churches use corporate law to formalize their entity’s existence, 134
churches use trademark law to protect their goodwill and
reputation as would any entity with valuable intellectual
property. 135 There is general agreement that the granting of
trademarks to churches does not violate the Establishment
Clause. 136
129. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757−58 (“[T]he First Amendment forbids the
government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the
expense of others.”).
130. See id. at 1758 (stating that trademark registration is not equivalent to
government speech or approval of the trademark registered).
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (“[T]he filing of the application to register such
mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority,
nationwide in effect . . . .”).
132. See Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 471−72 (stating that
statutes survive Establishment Clause scrutiny if they are neutral and are
applied even-handedly and broadly).
133. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612−13 (1971) (describing the
three-prong test as (1) statute must have a secular legislative purpose, (2)
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, and (3) must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion).
134. See Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1238 (6th
Cir. 1997) (noting the church as a Delaware corporation); Rosicrucian Fellowship
v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church, 245 P.2d 481, 489 (Cal. 1952)
(noting the corporate status of the religious organization).
135. See David A. Simon, Register Trademarks and Keep the Faith:
Trademarks, Religion and Identity, 49 IDEA 233, 239 (2009) (“[R]eligious
organizations
use trademark law
to
protect
their identities . . . because trademarks are cultural forms that assume local
meanings . . . for those who incorporate them into their daily lives.”).
136. The remainder of the Note focuses on the implications of church
trademarks on the Free Exercise Clause. For additional scholarship on
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However, state action deemed valid under the Establishment
Clause may be considered invalid under the Free Exercise
Clause. 137 The Supreme Court described the clash between the two
religious clauses of the First Amendment, saying, “These two
Clauses . . . are frequently in tension . . . . Yet we have long said
that ‘there is room for play in the joints’ between them. In other
words, there are some state actions permitted by the
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise
Clause.” 138 While it is settled that the granting of trademarks does
not abridge the Establishment Clause, 139 Free Exercise
implications remain.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 140 prevents
government regulation of religious beliefs and guarantees the
freedom to believe whatever religious doctrine one chooses, 141 as
“[t]he freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute.” 142
However, one may not claim “free exercise” to excuse disobeying a
Establishment Clause issues in the church trademark context, see Silversmith &
Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 468 (examining the clash between intellectual
property rights and the religious clauses of the First Amendment); N. Cameron
Russell, Allocation of New Top-Level Domain Names and the Effect Upon
Religious Freedom, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 697, 700 (2013)
(suggesting that there should be a strong presumption against religious
trademark protection to avoid constitutional violations).
137. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (recognizing that the
religious clauses of the First Amendment are distinct).
138. Id. at 718−19 (internal citations omitted (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of
City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))).
139. See supra notes 132−136 and accompanying text (stating that
religious-focused trademarks may survive Establishment Clause scrutiny).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
141. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The free
exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires.”); Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is
Dead, Long Lived Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability
Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 856 (2001) (“The government may
not . . . lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious
authority or dogma.”).
142. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (Warren, C.J.)
(“Compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship is strictly forbidden.”).
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neutral law. 143 In reality, there are limits on the “freedom” of free
exercise. 144 While the freedom to religious beliefs is absolute, the
freedom to act on those beliefs is not. 145
A law is unconstitutional only if it is aimed at promoting or
restricting religious beliefs. 146 In Employment Division v. Smith, 147
employees were denied unemployment benefits due to their
religious use of the drug peyote. 148 While the religious use of the
drug may have been legitimate, the justification behind the Oregon
law, which criminalized the use of peyote, outweighed any Free
Exercise concerns. 149 Although discriminatory in effect, the Oregon
law was neutral in its purpose and thus did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. 150
Much like Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the body of
cases involving the Free Exercise Clause is muddled. 151 Legislation
143. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (“[The] Court
has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental
regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for
‘even when the action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, [it] is not totally
free from legislative restrictions.’” (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603)).
144. See Duncan, supra note 141, at 850−51 (noting Court interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause as giving the government “a license . . . to ‘proscribe
conduct that . . . religion proscribes’”).
145. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (“The freedom to
act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. . . . [T]he power to regulate must be so exercised as not . . . unduly to
infringe the protected freedom.”).
146. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878−82 (stating that neutral and generally
applicable laws will only rarely violate the Free Exercise Clause).
147. 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
148. See id. at 875 (noting that the religious use of peyote was outlawed under
the Oregon law).
149. See id. at 878−80 (giving various examples of cases where neutral laws
that infringed upon religious practices were upheld).
150. See id. at 890 (noting that state legislatures are free to make religious
exceptions to their own laws that would prevent outcomes similar to the case in
question).
151. Congress responded to Smith and enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, which states that, “Government shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb−1 (2012). The Act is no longer applicable to
states. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (invalidating the Act
as applied to state action); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859−61 (2015) (indicating
that the Act was still in force regarding federal action). The Sixth Circuit
indicated the inapplicability of the Act to intra-church trademark disputes since
the Act “does not apply in suits between private parties.” Gen. Conf. Corp. of
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or state action must be neutral and generally applicable to avoid
triggering Free Exercise scrutiny. 152 If a law appears to target
religious practices or doctrine, the challenged state action must
pass the “compelling interest” test, which requires the state to
prove that the action does not burden free exercise rights, or to
prove that any incidental burden imposed is justified by a
compelling state interest. 153
On its face the Lanham Act, which governs the federal
issuance and enforcement of trademarks, 154 is not aimed at
promoting or restricting religious beliefsit is neutral. 155 The
issuance of church trademarks does not infringe on the religious
freedoms guaranteed in the First Amendment. 156 Free Exercise
issues do arise, however, once churches find themselves in disputes
with one another because these disputes force courts to intervene
in ecclesiastical conflicts. 157
While it is true that courts have an “obvious and legitimate
interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes,” 158 the
interest must be balanced with the courts’ duty to refrain from
involvement in doctrinal disputes in conflict with the Free Exercise
Clause. 159 Since the courts’ initial involvement in church property
Seventh Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 410 (6th Cir. 2010). For
additional scholarship on the Free Exercise Clause, see Duncan, supra note 141,
at 850 (arguing that Free Exercise is “alive and well in the wake of Smith”).
152. See Duncan, supra note at 141, 865−67 (“The neutrality requirement is
designed to forbid direct religious persecution, however, the ‘precise evil’
prohibited by the general applicability requirement is the inequality that results
when underinclusive legal prohibitions are enforced against religious conduct.”).
153. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (stating that a compelling state interest
must be “within the State’s constitutional power to regulate”).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
155. See supra notes 105−107 and accompanying text (discussing the neutral
application of federal trademark laws).
156. See supra notes 128–135 and accompanying text (noting that religious
freedoms are not violated when churches are granted federal trademarks).
157. See infra note 245 and accompanying text (describing cases where church
trademark disputes implicated the Free Exercise Clause).
158. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (stating that there is value in
the courts providing a civil forum for church property adjudication).
159. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344
U.S. 94, 120−21 (1952) (“[I]n those cases when the property right follows as an
incident from decisions of . . . ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls . . . in
order that there may be free exercise of religion.”); Rosicrucian Fellowship v.
Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church, 245 P.2d 481, 487 (Cal. 1952)
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disputes, “it was said that American law knew ‘no heresy and is
committed to the support of no dogma.’” 160
Courts must avoid interference with church doctrinal topics,
but should afford churches all protections allowed by civil law. 161
Before involvement in the case, courts must determine whether the
dispute will require them “to decide issues of religious law,
principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or administrationin other
words, is the corporate dispute actually ecclesiastical in nature.” 162
The Supreme Court has cautioned against heavy court
involvement in church doctrinal disputes, noting that justice would
likely not be promoted by judiciary review. 163 Justice Frankfurter
summarized many instances in history in which government
action threatened the independence of religious institutions. 164
This fear influenced the Court to adopt a specialized approach 165
for adjudicating church property disputes that would avoid free
exercise implications. 166
(“Although the principle that courts will not interfere in religious societies with
reference to their ecclesiastical practice stems from the separation of the church
and state, this view has always been qualified by the rule that civil and property
rights would be adjudicated.”).
160. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 319−20 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
679, 728 (1871)).
161. See Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d
1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that deprivation of protections of civil law
“would raise its own serious problems under the Free Exercise Clause”).
162. Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 87
(S.C. 2017).
163. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871) (“It is of the essence of these
religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of
questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all
cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism
itself provides for.”).
164. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 124−25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (listing
instances of interference with religion, such as Mussolini’s attack on the Church
of Rome, the Russian Church’s tsarist governance, and Bismark’s laws targeting
German Catholics).
165. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (“[L]ogic . . . leaves the civil courts
no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property
disputes.” (emphasis in original)).
166. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (noting that church autonomy is granted
protection under the Free Exercise Clause); Watson, 80 U.S. at 728 (“[T]he full
and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle
and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality
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When the property rights in dispute follow from ecclesiastical
incidents, such as decisions of church custom or law, court
involvement is precluded. 167 Justice Frankfurter noted that “a very
real danger to religious freedom [is] posed by even ostensibly
innocent government intrusions into essentially religious
matters.” 168 Ecclesiastical 169 disputes are thus quarantined from
all court involvement. 170
Many church property disputes result from a doctrinal schism
within a local congregation, causing a faction of the local church to
withdraw from the national organization. 171 These cases commonly
see “the belief on the part of those supporting disaffiliation that
they are the ones following the ‘true’ faith while the ecclesiastical
organizations above them are not.” 172 If there are underlying
and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all.”).
167. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 324 (noting that constitutional concerns
mandate church control in ecclesiastical disputes).
168. See id. at 325 (summarizing Justice Frankfurter’s concern over court
involvement in church issues); see also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (noting the power to exercise religious authority was the “essence of
this controversy”).
169. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 (1976)
(defining ecclesiastical as concerning “church discipline, ecclesiastical
government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of
morals required of them”); Rosicrucian Fellowship, 245 P.2d at 487−88
The courts of the land are not concerned with mere polemic discussions,
and cannot . . . determine the abstract truth of religious doctrines, or
adjudicate whether a certain person is a Catholic in good standing, or
settle mere questions of faith or doctrine, . . . or decide who the rightful
leader of a church ought to be . . . .
(citing CARL ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW § 313 (1933)).
170. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 87 (“If the dispute is ‘a
question of religious law or doctrine masquerading as a dispute over church
property or corporate control,’ then the Constitution of the United States requires
the civil court defer to the decision of the appropriate ecclesiastical authority.”).
171. See id. at 85 (“A congregational church is an independent organization,
governed solely within itself . . . , while a hierarchical (or ecclesiastical) church
may be defined as one organized as a body with other churches having similar
faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head.”); 1
GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.10 (2018) (noting that trademark adjudication is
complicated by church “schisms and requests to determine the ‘true’ religious
order”).
172. See Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. Cal. Presbytery, 2003
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8523, at *73−74 (Sept. 10, 2003) (noting that the lower
court violated “the rule prohibiting courts from interference in disputes over
religious doctrine” when it inquired into the beliefs of the church members).

LEFT WITH NO NAME

1371

doctrinal issues at play in the property dispute, the court must
refrain from addressing them. 173
Courts agree that involvement in an ecclesiastical issue is a
clear violation of the First Amendment. 174 This holds true in the
specific context of intra-church trademark adjudication. 175 Courts
that take “sides in a religious schism, purport to decide matters of
spiritual succession, and exclude dissenters from using the name,
symbols, and marks of the faith” violate the First Amendment. 176
Legal access to a religious organization’s name or symbol enables
the entity to retain control over its identity. 177
Some lower courts have adjudicated intra-church trademark
disputes with less disagreement than intra-church real property
disputes, 178 declaring that they do not require involvement in
ecclesiastical matters. 179 However, other lower courts are in
tension regarding the impact of trademark adjudication on free
exercise rights. 180 The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the
173. See Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian
Church, 245 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. 1952) (“The essential problem, nevertheless, is to
ascertain from the acts, dealings and usages of the parties where the various
rights rest in order to determine the ownership of civil and property rights, even
though some so-called ecclesiastical rights are involved.”).
174. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (“[T]he First Amendment
prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of
religious doctrine and practice.”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 732 (1871) (noting
the finality of ecclesiastical decisions made by church tribunals).
175. See infra Part IV.B.2 (outlining Free Exercise implications resulting
from intra-church trademark adjudication).
176. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S. Under the Hereditary
Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S., Inc., 628
F.3d 837, 846 (7th Cir. 2010).
177. See Simon, supra note 135, at 239−40 (“Control of the
organizational trademark is crucial to religious capital because the value of the
mark consists of its identity.”).
178. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 92
(S.C. 2017) (finding the court sharply divided over the real property dispute, but
largely in agreement on the validity of the mother church’s federal trademark
rights).
179. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 987 (4th Cir. 1944) (“No question
of religious liberty is involved.”); Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v.
McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 408 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Trademark law will not turn on
whether the plaintiffs’ members or McGill and his congregants are the true
believers.”).
180. Compare McGill, 617 F.3d at 408
The district court held that it had no jurisdiction to resolve a
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impact of court involvement in such disputes on the First
Amendment. 181 Existing scholarship on the constitutional
implications of intra-church trademark disputes affirms that the
issue is far from settled. 182
Due to the nature of intra-church trademark disputes, 183 court
adjudication inherently infringes on a church’s free exercise rights
under the First Amendment. 184 Neutral principles of law must be
used to adjudicate church trademark disputes, like any other
church property dispute. 185 Church trademarks are ecclesiastical
in nature 186 and, thus, precluded from court adjudication. 187 If
trademark-infringement claim brought by one sect against the other,
as that would require it to decide the doctrinal issue of proper
succession. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “the district court
can apply the regular factors that courts employ to determine
infringement” and that “[t]he defendants can raise neutral defenses,
such as prior use of the marks.”
with Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244,
1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (declaring that courts can decide church intellectual property
issues without violating the First Amendment); Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the
First Church of Christ v. Evans, 520 A.2d 1347, 1357 (N.J. 1987) (“As to the
question of whether an injunction would violate defendants’ rights to exercise
their religion freely . . . we go no further than to record our grave reservations.”).
181. Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area v. Eden Prairie Presbyterian Church,
Inc., 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 375, review denied, 2017 Minn. LEXIS 444
(July 18, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2619 (June 11, 2018); Protestant Episcopal
Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, cert. denied, No. 17-1136, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (U.S. June 11,
2018).
182. See Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 505 (debating Free
Exercise implications of church trademark adjudications); Simon, supra note 135,
at 239 (noting that a church’s trademark may encompass its identity); Russell,
supra note 136, at 711 (stating that trade names may be a “religious touchstone
for another individual”).
183. This Note focuses on trademark disputes between churches, resulting
from local churches leaving the national church or splitting from a local church.
Most disputes of this nature involve hierarchical church structure. See supra note
171 and accompanying text (defining hierarchical).
184. See infra Part IV.B.2 and accompanying text (asserting that church
trademarks are ecclesiastical in nature and should be freed from court
involvement). This Note only examines free exercise rights in intra-church
trademark adjudication. Church suits involving third party trademark
infringement are not at issue in this analysis.
185. See supra notes 47−61 and accompanying text (summarizing the neutral
principles approach).
186. See infra notes 221−223 (discussing the ecclesiastical character of church
names).
187. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (using neutral principles of
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courts decide trademark disputes between churches, they involve
themselves in ecclesiastical matters that are barred from court
consideration, which violates the Free Exercise Clause. 188
1. Neutral Principles of Law
The Supreme Court has long stated that real property
disputes between churches are to be decided on neutral principles
of law. 189 Lower courts generally apply neutral principles of law to
settle real church property disputes, 190 but are not consistent in
applying neutral principles to intra-church intellectual property
disputes. 191 While “[t]he State has an obvious and legitimate
interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in
providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can
be determined conclusively,” 192 courts do not uniformly adjudicate
claims to reach this goal. 193
law to free courts from doctrinal entanglement); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679,
729 (1872) (stating church hierarchical bodies must decide ecclesiastical matters).
188. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602 (adjudicating church property disputes cannot
involve “consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of
worship or the tenets of faith” (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God
v. Church of God, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
189. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (noting that the Court has no “ecclesiastical
jurisdiction”).
190. See First Indep. Missionary Baptist Church v. McMillan, 153 So. 2d 337,
339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that the church abandoned its real
property); Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82,
90−91 (S.C. 2017) (deciding in favor of the national church after a neutral
principles analysis).
191. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402,
408 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying neutral principles of law to church trademark
adjudication); Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1244 (6th
Cir. 1997) (remanding for application consistent with neutral principles);
Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 92 (neglecting to go through a neutral
principles analysis in deciding the trademark dispute); Okla. Dist. Council of the
Assemblies of God of Okla. v. New Hope Assembly of God Church of Norman, 597
P.2d 1211, 1213 (Okla. 1979) (applying neutral principles after determining the
dispute did not rest upon doctrinal analysis); Lutheran Free Church v. Lutheran
Free Church, 141 N.W.2d 827, 831 (Minn. 1966) (comparing doctrinal beliefs of
church factions in lieu of neutral principles).
192. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602.
193. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (noting cases where the lower
courts are inconsistent with their application of neutral principles in trademark
disputes).

1374

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1345 (2019)

Although Congress codified modern trademark law in 1946, 194
intellectual property common law has an older origin. 195 It is not
surprising then that court adjudication of religious marks precedes
the Lanham Act, 196 creating a disconnect between the intersection
of trademark law and the neutral principles of law approach. 197
Many times, when courts incorporate neutral principles of law
into a trademark analysis they simultaneously make doctrinal
declarations. 198 Courts abandoned the “departure from doctrine”
approach applied to real church property disputes in favor of the
neutral principles approach, 199 but remnants of the former are still
seen in church trademark analysis. 200 In Lutheran Free Church v.
194. See Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (defining criteria for
federal recognition of trademarks).
195. See Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1 c. 3 (Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents
(codifying
the
first
intellectual property law); see also B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S.
Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015) (“Trademark law has a long history, going back at least to
Roman times.” (citing Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9, cmt. b
(1993)).
196. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 991 (4th Cir. 1944) (adjudicating
a church trademark dispute prior to enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946);
Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (same).
197. Compare McGill, 617 F.3d at 408 (“As this case involves the
enforceability of intellectual-property rights, it makes sense to consider the
Supreme Court’s precedents in the area of church property disputes.”), with
Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 90−92 (applying neutral principles of
law to the real property dispute, while applying federal trademark law to church
service marks and trade names foregoing a complete neutral principles analysis).
198. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976)
(“[T]he Supreme Court of Illinois substituted its interpretation of the Diocesan
and Mother Church constitutions for that of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals
in which church law vests authority to make that interpretation.”); McGill, 617
F.3d at 408 (noting the doctrinal similarities between the plaintiff and defendant
pastor, leader of the breakaway church); Lutheran Free Church, 141 N.W.2d at
831 (stating that there were no doctrinal differences between the Lutheran Free
Church and the American Lutheran Church).
199. See Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Right of Charitable or Religious
Association or Corporation to Protection Against Use of Same or Similar Name by
Another, 37 A.L.R.3d 277 (2018) (defining “departure from doctrine” as granting
title to the “[church faction] remaining faithful to the doctrine upon which the
society was organized”).
200. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1872) (departing from the English
courts’ approach of deciding “the true standard of faith in the church”); see also
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451−52 (1969) (“[A] civil court may no more review a church
decision applying a state departure-from-doctrine standard than it may apply
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Lutheran Free Church, 201 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
determined that the majority faction of the congregation did not
deviate from the doctrinal beliefs of the original church and was
thus entitled to use the name “Lutheran Free Church.” 202 There,
the Minnesota court engaged in an ecclesiastical determination at
odds with neutral principles and the Free Exercise Clause. 203 This
sort of analysis defeats the purpose of using the neutral principles
approach, which seeks to free the court from any involvement in
church doctrine. 204
Neutral principles of law are violated any time a court
analyzes the doctrinal beliefs of a religious organization. 205 Courts
recognize that obvious declarations proclaiming who the “true
church is” crosses the line in real property disputes, 206 yet approve
of an analytical framework which compares the religious beliefs
between two religious organizations when deciding intellectual

that standard itself.”).
201. 141 N.W.2d 827 (Minn. 1966).
202. See id. at 835–36 (declaring the majority faction the rightful owner of
the tradename “Lutheran Free Church”).
203. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (noting that the Court has no “ecclesiastical
jurisdiction”).
204. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (“The primary advantages of
the neutral principles approach are that it is completely secular in operation.”
(emphasis added)).
205. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at
449
First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property
litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of
controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts
undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the
property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free
development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests
in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.
206. See Nat’l Bd. of YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615, 624 (4th Cir. 1971)
(“[A]ny determination by a Court of Law as to whether plaintiff has deviated from
a ‘Christian’ purpose . . . is prohibited by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.”); Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S. Under
the Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of
the U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 837, 842−43, 846 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing the lower
court’s declaration that “[t]here is only one Baha’i Faith,” and that the National
Spiritual Assembly is the “highest authority for the Faith in [the] continental
United States and is entitled to exclusive use of the marks and symbols of the
Faith”).
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property matters. 207 The Supreme Court stated that any
involvement in doctrinal or ideological discussion is
prohibitedthere is no exception for any type of doctrinal analysis,
even if the court is not making decisions regarding who is the “true
church.” 208
Courts should commit to applying neutral principles of law to
all church property disputes, real and intellectual property
alike. 209 If a court decides that real property disputes cannot be
decided on the basis that the dispute is really a “question of
religious law or doctrine masquerading as a dispute over church
property [and] corporate control” 210 and is ecclesiastical, then it
follows that any simultaneous dispute over trademarks should
undertake the same analysis. 211 The Supreme Court recognized
that churches are unique in their purpose and set out the neutral
principles approach to accommodate for their differences. 212
207. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402,
408 (6th Cir. 2010) (comparing the religious beliefs of churches and stating that
the beliefs are identical); Lutheran Free Church v. Lutheran Free Church, 141
N.W.2d 827, 831 (Minn. 1966) (same); see also Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 445−46 (rejecting the “departure from doctrine”
inquiry used by English courts that require courts to analyze whether church
doctrine is consistent with expected organization beliefs).
208. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at
451−52 (“The First Amendment prohibits a State from employing religious
organizations as an arm of the civil judiciary to perform the function of
interpreting and applying state standards.”); see also Wolf, 443 U.S. at 607−09
(finding that the inquiry boiled down to which faction represented the “true”
church).
209. See infra note 216 and accompanying text (describing the neutral
principles framework as the best insurance against Free Exercise violations).
210. Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 86
(S.C. 2017) (quoting All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church,
685 S.E.2d 163, 172 (S.C. 2009)).
211. See id. at 84−85, 92−93 (concluding that “the present property and
church governance disputes are not appropriate for resolution in the civil courts,”
yet deciding the trademark dispute based on federal trademark law). The
trademark dispute was decided in favor of the National church in the U.S. District
Court for the District of South Carolina. See vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, No.
2:13-587-RMG (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2019) (granting summary judgment for the
National Episcopal church and enjoining the dissociated parishes from using the
trademarked names).
212. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 985 (4th Cir. 1944) (noting that
churches “exist for the worship of Almighty God and for the purpose of benefiting
mankind and not for purposes of profit”).
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Applying neutral principles of law to intellectual property
disputes does not mean that courts must ignore federal trademark
law. 213 Neutral principles would direct courts to first consider
whether the issue they are adjudicating, church trademarks, is
ecclesiastical. 214 If the issue is ecclesiastical then the court would
be precluded from applying federal trademark law to the
dispute. 215
Courts should treat all property disputes with the same
analytical approach provided by neutral principles of law. 216 In an
area complicated by complex constitutional law issues, lower
courts need to apply neutral principles consistently. 217 The
Supreme Court provided a consistent framework for intra-church
real property disputes, which can similarly be applied to church
trademark disputes. 218

213. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 725 (1872) (“[W]here there is a schism
which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such
bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles
which govern voluntary associations.”).
214. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 87 (determining that first
courts must determine whether the adjudication requires involvement in issues
of religion).
215. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (“If in such a case the
interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to
resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the
doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.”).
216. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709−10
(1976) (noting that where “resolution of the disputes cannot be made without
extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity” neutral principles
is superseded by deference to the church tribunal); Protestant Episcopal Church,
806 S.E.2d at 87, 91−92 (describing the first step of neutral principles).
217. Compare Tubeville v. Morris, 26 S.E.2d 821, 826−29 (S.C. 1943)
(attempting to apply neutral principals to the trademark dispute over use of the
church name), with Purcell, 145 F.2d at 987−88 (wading into ecclesiastical
matters by applying trademark law without reference to neutral principles); see
also Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 525 (remarking that Morris
and Purcell adjudicated the same dispute yet produced drastically different
results).
218. See supra notes 47, 166 (outlining the framework for church property
disputes).
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2. Church Trademarks are Ecclesiastical in Nature

Once courts implement the neutral principles of law analysis
for intra-church trademark disputes, the first step will preclude
further adjudication. 219 In intra-church property disputes, the first
step decides which path the court should take. 220 Because of the
inherently ecclesiastical nature of church trademarks, 221 when
asked whether the adjudication requires involvement in “issues of
religious law,” 222 the courts will be forced to answer yes. 223 The
presence of ecclesiastical “issues of religious law” bars the court
from engaging in a neutral principles analysis and mandates
deference to the highest church authority. 224 In other words, a
dispute over the use of a church trademark 225 is ecclesiastical and
courts are precluded from involvement. 226
Trademarks, specifically tradenames, 227 are representative of
an entity’s identity. 228 Churches seek out tradename protection to
219. See Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d
1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that deference is mandatory when the dispute
would have the court “intrude impermissibly into religious doctrinal issues”).
220. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (noting that while neutral
principles of law is available for use by courts, the approach is not appropriate
where doctrinal issues are involved).
221. See Simon, supra note 135, at 239 (noting that trade names encompass
the entities’ identity); infra notes 226, 228 (arguing the ecclesiastical nature of
church names).
222. Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 87
(S.C. 2017).
223. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 320 (“[A] sound view rooted in our
perception of church and state relations would require courts to accept, as final
and binding, those decisions pertaining to religious matters made by the church's
highest authority.”).
224. See Masterson v. Diocese of N.W. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 602 (Tex. 2013)
(noting deference is “compulsory because courts lack jurisdiction to decide
ecclesiastical questions”).
225. See Simon, supra note 135, at 237 (describing collective trademarks that
represent that the “source of the goods or services is a member of a larger group”).
226. See id. at 240 (arguing that church trademarks are a legally cognizable
form of the church’s identity).
227. See Church of God v. Church of God, 50 A.2d 357, 362 (Penn. 1947)
(granting exclusive rights to the phrase “Church of God” to one faction over
another).
228. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir. 1944) (concluding
that the name of a church has great value “because millions of members
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safeguard identity, 229 but are unique in that the tradename
represents a specific religious identity. 230 Several courts recognize
this function of trademarks in the religious context. 231 Even if the
dispute revolved around the use of a church name such as “Main
Street Church,” and lacked any reference to a specific religious
denomination, the name would still represent a congregation’s
identity. Any conflict regarding the use of “Main Street Church”
would be ecclesiastical and barred from court involvement under
neutral principles analysis.
A church’s name represents to the world what its congregants
practice and believe. 232 Through intra-church trademark
adjudication the court effectively tells the church banned from
using the trademark at issue that they are not entitled to the
identity attached to the respective mark. 233
A prime example is the case of General Conference Corp. v.
McGill. 234 In this Sixth Circuit case, Reverend McGill left the
associated with the name the most sacred of their personal relationships and the
holiest of their family traditions”).
229. See Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 486−87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (noting
the common law rule that an entity is entitled to protection to its name under
which business has been conducted); Tarr, supra note 87 (“[T]rademark law
allows churches to forge identities representing coherent spiritual messages, with
which their members can align.”).
230. See Simon, supra note 135, at 240 (“Thus, the whole identity of the
religious groupits ideology, its teachings and its practicesis contained in an
identity-indicating name or symbol.”); Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and
Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 388 (2011) (noting that traditional trademark
doctrine sees trademarks as source identifiers).
231. See Church of God v. Church of God of Prophecy, Opposition No. 94,180,
2000 TTAB LEXIS 338, at *9−12 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (noting that the trademark in
question may represent the identity and ideology of the church, but it is not a
proper inquiry for the administrative board); Simon, supra note 135, at 278−79
(noting that the court “implicated identity” in its trademark infringement
analysis) (discussing Church of God, 50 A.2d at 357−62)); Purcell, 145 F.2d at 982
(noting the church’s name had value because it represented the church’s identity
to the public).
232. See Simon, supra note 135, at 240 (“The collective mark represents the
embodiment of the organization’s collective identity as owned by a
groupsomething identified with and by all members of a religion.”).
233. See Russell, supra note 136, at 711 (“Because the trade name may be a
‘religious touchstone for another individual,’ this acknowledgement of property
protection may impede the ability of individuals to freely exercise religion without
government interference.”).
234. 617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010).
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General Conference Corporation of Seventh-day Adventists over a
doctrinal dispute, and began his own church, which he called “A
Creation Seventh Day & Adventist Church.” 235 The General
Conference Corporation had multiple trademarks, including
“Seventh-day Adventists,” and sought to enjoin McGill from
describing his church with the term. 236 In deciding the case, the
court noted that, “[b]oth the plaintiffs and McGill believe that the
second coming of Christ is imminent and that the Sabbath should
be celebrated on Saturday.” 237 The court concluded that the
General Conference Corporation’s trademark of “Seventh-day
Adventists” was valid, barring McGill from use of the term in
naming his church. 238 McGill and his congregation were, thus,
stripped from use of the term that accurately described their
identity to the outside world. 239
In its discussion, the court not only analyzed the religious
beliefs of the two churches, 240 a purely doctrinal issue, but it also
reviewed the ecclesiastical issue of deciding which church was able
to continue use of the identity-defining trademark. 241 As Justice
Frankfurter noted, “[U]nder [the] Constitution it is not open to the
governments of this Union to reinforce the loyalty of their citizens
by deciding who is the true exponent of their religion.” 242 The
government, including the courts, has no place in religious

235. See id. at 405 (noting that the corporation holds title to all of the church’s
assets, indicating a hierarchical structure).
236. See id. (describing the various trademarks owned by the church that
McGill allegedly infringed on).
237. Id. at 408.
238. See id. at 416 (affirming the lower court’s ruling that McGill’s use of the
mark would cause confusion to the general public).
239. See id. at 405 (noting that McGill formed the church out of a “divine
revelation”).
240. See id. at 408 (comparing the beliefs of the two congregations).
241. See id. at 416−17 (granting continued use of trademarks to the General
Conference Corp.). In contrast to the Sixth Circuit, the district court in McGill
took the neutral principles approach. See id. at 408 (“The district court held that
it had no jurisdiction to resolve a trademark-infringement claim brought by one
sect against the other, as that would require it to decide the doctrinal issue of
proper succession.”).
242. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S.
94, 125 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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matters. 243 A neutral principles of law approach would preclude
the court from making similar decisions. 244
McGill is not an oddity in intra-church trademark
jurisprudence. 245 Churches will continue to face the threat of loss
of identifying marks and names because of the hierarchical
organization in which the churches are formed. 246 “Nearly
all . . . varieties of churches of the same denomination are the
results of secession or withdrawals from the parent church of that
name, and it has been the usual course for the new church to adopt
as a permanent part of its name the name of the parent
organization.” 247 Churches are vulnerable to infringement action
when they continue using their “parent’s” name in their new
identifying marks. 248
Churches are not like corporations, whose application of
federal trademark law is fairly straightforward. 249 When
243. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
244. See supra notes 214−215 and accompanying text (describing the neutral
principles of law approach); see also Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church
of Christ, Scientist v. Robinson, 115 F. Supp. 2d 607, 610 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (“If a
parent religious society remains true to the tenets of the religion, it is entitled to
protection against a minority’s use of the same name.” (citing 1 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS § 9:7 (4th Ed. 2000))).
245. See Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (seeing
the seceding minority group barred from use of the church’s name); Lutheran Free
Church v. Lutheran Free Church, 141 N.W.2d 827, 831−33 (Minn. 1966) (seeing
a minority congregation of a church lose its right to use the name it held for sixty
years due to the majority’s merger with another congregation under a new name);
Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 84−85, 92 (2017)
(barring the local church’s use of the national church’s identifying name, which it
used for over 200 years).
246. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 85 (“[A] hierarchical [or
ecclesiastical] church may be defined as one organized as a body with other
churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or
ecclesiastical head.”); Fennelly, supra note 39, at 321 (explaining that because
hierarchical churches have both vertical and horizontal aspects, the church is
defined as “the body of believers, united associationally as well as juridically
beyond the congregation”).
247. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Evans, 105
N.J. 297, 312 (1987) (citation omitted).
248. See id. at 301−04 (finding a breakaway church sued by its “parent”
church over use of identifying marks).
249. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 984 (4th Cir. 1944) (“[T]o use the
name of a corporation . . . in such way as to attempt to appropriate the good will
transferred and deprive the transferee of what it has thus acquired, is a wrong
which should be enjoined . . . .”).
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corporations seek to infringe on another’s trademark it is for the
competitive advantage that mark provides. 250 However, when
churches infringe on another’s trademark it is because of the
religious organization’s long history of association with that
trademark, which represents the congregation’s beliefs. 251 The
inherently religious nature of church names deserves special
concern in trademark adjudication. 252
Churches are unique in their purpose and should be treated
uniformly regarding all property disputes. 253 Requiring application
of the neutral principles of law approach to church trademark
disputes, along with a finding that church tradenames are
ecclesiastical, would prevent courts from further entanglement in
doctrinal disputes. 254 Uniform application of neutral principles to
real and intellectual property disputes provides churches with a
consistent framework to plan for the future and prevent
disputes. 255
A return to Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church
illustrates the dangers of inconsistent application of neutral

250. See id. (describing trademark infringement as “unfair competition”).
251. See Patricia Sullivan, ‘The church is not the building. It is our faith and
POST
(Dec.
26,
2015),
our
people.’,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/the-church-is-not-thebuilding-it-is-our-faith-and-our-people/2015/12/26/dce43392-a41f-11e5-9c4ebe37f66848bb_story.html?utm_term=.f946e14c2436 (last visited June 8, 2019)
(“[W]e know in our heart of hearts the church is not the building. It is our faith
and our people.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); but see Purcell,
145 F.2d at 987
The right to use the name inheres in the institution, not in its
members; and, when they cease to be members of the institution, use
by them of the name is misleading and, if injurious to the institution,
should be enjoined. No question of religious liberty is involved.
252. See supra notes 221, 227−233 and accompanying text (discussing the
ecclesiastical identity imbedded in a church’s trademark).
253. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (applying neutral principles
of law).
254. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases
that could have benefitted from a neutral principles approach to trademark
adjudication).
255. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603−04 (explaining that churches can write
procedures for resolving potential disputes into their trusts and books of order
because the court will examine those documents when applying the neutral
principles approach).
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principles. 256 Recall the dispute began when the national Episcopal
Church made polity changes, which the South Carolina local
church’s bishop disagreed with. 257 The Episcopal Church is
hierarchical, meaning that the national Episcopal Church has title
to the property on which the local church in South Carolina is
located. 258 Hierarchical church structure mandates that courts
defer to decisions of the highest ecclesiastical involvement when
doctrinal issues are at play. 259
When the local church sought to leave the Episcopal Church,
it began “providing Parishes with quitclaim deeds purporting to
disclaim any interest of the Diocese” so that it could maintain
control of the church’s real property. 260 The local church also
amended its bylaws to renounce any affiliation with the national
church. 261 The national churchthe highest ecclesiastical
bodyaccepted the local church’s renunciation of its affiliation
with the larger diocese, yet retained control of the congregation
through the appointment of a new bishop. 262 The South Carolina
Supreme Court held that because of the church’s hierarchical
structure, the court was bound by decisions of the church’s “highest
ecclesiastical body.” 263 Because the national church accepted the
renunciation and ordained a new bishop, the civil court had no
place stepping into an ecclesiastical dispute. 264 With the national
256. See 806 S.E.2d 82, 88−92 (analyzing the real property and intellectual
property disputes with differing breadths).
257. See id. at 90 n.8 (noting that the bishop and his congregation were
uncomfortable with the mother church’s selection of the first openly homosexual
bishop).
258. See id. at 85−86 (finding that the Episcopal Church is hierarchical).
259. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1872) (stating that when
questions of polity are involved, courts must defer to the church’s highest
ecclesiastical authority).
260. Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 91.
261. See id. (“[V]arious parishes in the Diocese undertook to sever the
relationship between themselves and TEC through corporate amendments.”).
262. See id. (executing the separation of the two factions).
263. See id. (giving deference to the church’s ruling body (citing Pearson v.
Church of God, 478 S.E.2d 849, 852 (S.C. 1996))).
264. See id. (“The finding that TEC is hierarchal requires that I defer to its
highest ecclesiastical body.”).
TEC has recognized the Associated Diocese to be the true Lower
Diocese of South Carolina with Bishop vonRosenburg as its head, a
civil court cannot inject itself into this church governance dispute and
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church’s ruling, the church’s real property vested in the new
bishop’s faction, who remained loyal to the national church. 265
The same dispute also involved claims of trademark
infringement over the local church’s right to state-granted service
marks, which indicated affiliation with the Episcopal Church. 266
While the court spent nineteen pages analyzing the real property
dispute, it decided the service mark conflict in a single
paragraph. 267 Instead of analyzing the trademark claim with the
neutral principles approach, the court immediately looked to state
trademark law to determine that the state service marks must be
cancelled in favor of the national church’s federal marks. 268
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari of the case, laying
the real property issue to rest, while the trademark dispute faced
further adjudication in the U.S. District Court of South
Carolina. 269 Bishop Lawrence’s local church faction lost the legal
right to their church’s real property in the state case, and were
then dealt a loss of rights to service marks that identified them as
the church they had been for more than 150 years. 270 While a
straightforward application of trademark laws may dictate one
church faction’s rights to the use of marks over another, 271 history
reevaluate that decision applying state law principles because this is a
question of church polity, administration, and governance, matters
into which civil courts may not intrude.

Id.
265. See id. at 92−93 (recognizing the Episcopal Church’s authority over the
matter, which, in effect, granted property to the loyal church faction).
266. See id. at 92 (noting respondents’ use of the term “Episcopal,” and the
national church’s federally−registered trademarks, which include “The Episcopal
Church” and “The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America”).
267. See id. (applying trademark law to determine that “in light
of . . . confusion” caused by the state marks, they must be cancelled).
268. See id. (“[S]tate law dictates that the [national church’s] right to these
marks is superior.” (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1145 (2016))).
269. See vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, No. 2:13-587-RMG (D.S.C. Sept. 19,
2019) (enjoining the breakaway churches from continued use of service marks).
270. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 85 (noting the national
church was formed when the S.C. Diocese formed with six others); see also Knapp,
supra note 23 (discussing the emotional heartbreak experienced by congregants
after the national church’s S.C. court victory).
271. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (detailing steps necessary for an
infringement action); see also Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1921) (applying common trademark law to determine that the majority was
entitled to exclusive use of the mark).
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V. Should the Court Maintain Its Current Role?
In his concurrence to Kedroff, 273 Justice Frankfurter
recognized the ability of church property, specifically a church’s
cathedral, to represent more than just a piece of land, stating that
the cathedral served as an “outward symbol of a religious faith.” 274
The purpose of a trademark is, similarly, meant to be a source
identifier. 275 Just like the cathedral in Kedroff represented the
religious faith of the congregation, 276 a church’s name, serves the
same purpose. 277 If the neutral principles approach is used to deal
with the first property at issue, 278 why is it not used to deal with
the second? 279
Current court adjudication of intra-church trademark
disputes violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First
272. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344
U.S. 94, 102−03 (1952) (detailing church’s history of political upheaval due to the
Bolshevik Revolution and political unrest in Russia); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
679, 734 (1979) (acknowledging the schism over the issue of slavery that “divided
the Presbyterian churches through-out Kentucky and Missouri”).
273. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
274. See id. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“St. Nicholas Cathedral is
not just a piece of real estate. . . . A cathedral is the seat and center of
ecclesiastical authority. . . . What is at stake here is the power to exercise religious
authority. That is the essence of this controversy.”).
275. See Okla. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Okla. v. New Hope
Assembly of God Church of Norman, 597 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Okla. 1979) (noting in
trademarks that carry a secondary meaning “the word or name has come to stand
in the minds of the public as a name or identification for that product or firm”).
276. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he
religious authority becomes manifest and is exerted through authority over the
Cathedral as the outward symbol of a religious faith.”).
277. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 982−83 (4th Cir. 1944) (“The name
of this church . . . was of great value, not only because business was carried on
and property held in that name, but also because millions of members associated
with the name the most sacred of their personal relationships and the holiest of
their family traditions.”).
278. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120−21 (noting that where a property right flows
from an ecclesiastical issue, courts must yield to church rule).
279. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 92 (finding the court
applying trademark law without discussion of neutral principles).
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Amendment. 280 The Supreme Court consistently recognized that
First Amendment dangers accompany court resolution of church
disputes, which led to the adoption of the neutral principles
approach. 281 The framework is adaptable to any church dispute
over property rights. 282
Trademarks are a form of property rights. 283 At their core,
trademarks carry the right to exclude others from the use of the
registered mark, name, or symbol. 284 Trademarks have evolved to
the point that the rights “are beginning to resemble a type of
‘property right in gross.’” 285 In sum, trademarks have inherent
valuethe right to exclusive use 286akin to the value recognized
in real property. 287 Trademarks, as property rights, are entitled to

280. See supra notes 186−188, 204−208 (analyzing the Free Exercise
implications that occur when courts adjudicate ecclesiastical trademark rights).
281. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 729−32 (recognizing the danger in courts
unfamiliar with ecclesiastical law adjudicating a church dispute).
282. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (stating that the neutral principles
approach was developed “for use in all property disputes”).
283. See Nat’l Bd. of the YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615, 624−25 (D.S.C.
1971) (declaring that “a trademark is a property right”); Adam Mossoff,
Trademark As A Property Right, 107 KY. L.J. 1, 7 (2018) (characterizing
trademarks as a property “use-right,” and detailing other “use-rights” such as
easements); Richard Epstein, Two Ways of Viewing IP, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2005),
https://www.ft.com/content/c3e23a90-a5ea-11d9-b67b-00000e2511c8 (last visited
Sept. 23, 2019) (stating that the “sound rules of property law” apply to intellectual
property) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); but see Peter S.
Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, REGULATION,
Fall 2007, at 36−38 (questioning whether the traditional notions of tangible
property
should
apply
to
intellectual
property),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/10/v30n36.pdf.
284. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (requiring trademark applicants to ensure
the exclusive use of the mark).
285. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 n.53 (2004) (noting that courts frequently
refer to trademarks as property rights themselves, rather than in the goodwill
they protect).
286. See Mossoff, supra note 283, at 4 (“Trademark law secures the exclusive
use and enjoyment of a mark as representative of the exclusive use and enjoyment
of the underlying property.”).
287. See Mossoff, supra note 283, at 14 (noting that property is not just the
tangible aspect, but “the right to freely possess, use, and alienate the same”
(emphasis added)).
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the same deferential approach set out by the Supreme Court
through neutral principles. 288
Those who find current court adjudication of intra-church
trademark disputes consistent with the Free Exercise Clause
overlook the purpose behind neutral principles. 289 Two such
scholars noted that because trademark law is facially neutral the
Free Exercise Clause is not implicated. 290 The analysis, however,
cannot end here. While a church may receive trademark protection
without Free Exercise implications, 291 issues arise once that mark
is in dispute. 292
When a church is stripped of its trademark, it loses the right
to use that mark. 293 In the context of intra-church disputes, this
property loss prevents the losing party from referring to itself in
its preferred manner. 294 A two-hundred-year-old congregation
loses its identifying marks; 295 a pastor is barred from referring to
his church as his chosen denomination; 296 a minority congregation
288. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 (1979) (requiring deference be given
to the church’s ruling body in cases concerning the church’s identity).
289. See Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 521−22 (theorizing
that the application of trademark law does not carry Free Exercise implications).
290. See id. (“[T]here has been no suggestion that the trade name and
trademarks legislation was passed with the invidious design of inhibiting one
group's free exercise.”).
291. See id. (noting the grant of trademark protection does not inhibit
worship).
292. Silversmith and Guggenheim recognize the role played by neutral
principles, stating that “[c]ourts must only apply neutral principles of law” to
intra-church trademark disputes. Id. at 526.
293. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012) (granting injunctive relief for parties deemed
the rightful owners of a trademark).
294. See First Indep. Missionary Baptist Church v. McMillan, 153 So. 2d 337,
342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (inhibiting the minority faction from using a name
abandoned by the majority); Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1921) (declaring right to the church’s name in the majority faction); but see
Pilgrim Holiness Church v. First Pilgrim Holiness Church, 252 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1969) (allowing the minority faction to keep its preferred name
previously abandoned by the majority).
295. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 92
(S.C. 2017) (canceling the local church’s state trademarks in favor of the national
church’s federal marks).
296. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402,
415−17 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding the infringement claim against a pastor’s use
of the term “Seventh-day Adventist”).
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can no longer use the name it has held for over sixty years. 297 It is
hard to deny that violations of the Free Exercise Clause have
occurred in the previous examples. 298 A church’s exercise of
religion is burdened when it is prevented from publicly identifying
with its preferred name or mark. 299 This type of burden on free
exercise is the very thing neutral principles of law was created to
avoid. 300
While it would be simpler to immediately apply trademark law
to such disputes, 301 constitutional concerns mandate a preemptive
neutral principles analysis. 302 If courts apply neutral principles
they are prevented from ever applying trademark law, as neutral
principles tells courts to cease involvement once ecclesiastical
issues are known. 303 The free exercise concern lies not with the
trademark law itself, but with the property at issue−the inherently
ecclesiastical trademark. 304

297. See Lutheran Free Church v. Lutheran Free Church, 141 N.W.2d 827,
835−36 (Minn. 1966) (ruling against a minority faction who opposed the church’s
merger and sought to retain possession of the old name).
298. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344
U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (stressing the importance of a church’s “power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as
those of faith and doctrine”).
299. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 355−56 (noting that the Free Exercise
Clause provides for church autonomy, including “the right to select their own
leaders, define their own doctrines resolve their own disputes, and run their own
institutions”).
300. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (recognizing the role neutral
principles play in preventing courts from violating the Free Exercise Clause).
301. See Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 525 (stating that
courts are able to “simply resolve the trade-name issue on property grounds”).
302. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 87 (“The court must first
determine whether the property/corporate dispute will require the court to decide
issues . . . actually ecclesiastical in nature.”).
303. See id. (noting the court must cease involvement in the dispute once
issues of polity or religion become apparent).
304. See All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 685
S.E.2d 163, 172 (S.C. 2009) (cautioning courts to carefully analyze the property
in dispute to determine whether it is a question of religious law rather than
property law).
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While neutral principles of law is not a perfect approach, 305 it
is the framework given by the Supreme Court. 306 All property
cases, real and intellectual alike, should be subject to the same
deferential approach afforded by neutral principles of law. 307
Under current conditions, churches are left in purgatory over their
rights to church trademarks. 308 Religious institutions deserve a
consistent framework that can be applied to a myriad of property
disputes. 309 A church schism is difficult enough without court
intrusion. 310 It was not by accident that the nation’s founders
included provisions for religious freedom and protection in the
First Amendment. 311 And while the Court responsible for the
neutral principles approach worried that it would “increase the
involvement of civil courts in church controversies,” 312 the majority
of the Supreme Court recognized that the need for a framework for
such disputes outweighed concerns over religious entanglement. 313
In a perfect world the Supreme Court would grant certiorari
and clear up confusion surrounding intra-church trademark
adjudication. 314 For now, courts are left trying to fit a doctrine from
305. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 610 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s adoption of neutral principles that would “invite
intrusion into church polity”).
306. See id. at 602−03 (adopting the neutral principles approach).
307. See id. at 609 (noting that if the case required invasion of polity, “then
the First Amendment requires that the . . . courts give deference to the
presbyterial commission’s determination of that church’s identity”).
308. See supra note 211 (finding the state trademark claim continued in
federal court); Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 525 (detailing
conflicting opinions between the South Carolina Supreme Court and the Fourth
Circuit over the same property dispute).
309. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at
449 (noting the neutral principles approach’s flexibility).
310. See Brief for 106 Religious Leaders as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents’ Petition For Rehearing at 17, Protestant Episcopal Church v.
Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 2017) (No. 15-000622) [hereinafter Brief
for 106 Religious Leaders] (discussing the $500 million property at stake in the
fractured congregation’s dispute).
311. See supra note 164 (detailing instances of government interference in
religious matters).
312. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., dissenting) (declaring that the
neutral principles approach “departs from long-established precedents”).
313. See id. at 605−06 (stating that the neutral principles approach does not
‘“inhibit’ the free exercise of religion”).
314. See Brief for 106 Religious Leaders, supra note 310, at 17−18 (noting the
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1979 to current intellectual property disputes mired in religious
turmoil. 315
VI. Conclusion
Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding church real
property disputes is subject to special rules to account for the
complexities surrounding court involvement in a religious
dispute. 316 The neutral principles approach, adopted by the
Supreme Court decades ago, is applied inconsistently to
intellectual property by lower federal and state courts. 317
If the neutral principles approach were consistently applied, it
would preclude court involvement in intra-church intellectual
property disputes, specifically trademark disputes. 318 Church
trademarks, such as a church’s name or symbol, are inherently
ecclesiastical due to the association of the mark with the church’s
identity and religious beliefs. 319 Court inquiry into intra-church
trademark disputes violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment because it essentially tells one church faction, “You
are the church,” while telling the other, “You are not.” 320 In effect,
insecurity surrounding intra-church disputes that makes “many rounds of future
litigation inevitable”).
315. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602−09 (adopting the modern neutral principles
framework).
316. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at
449 (approving of the neutral principles approach to avoid the ever-present
hazards of inhibiting free exercise of religion).
317. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402,
408−10 (6th Cir. 2010) (failing to apply the neutral principles framework); Purcell
v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 985−87 (4th Cir. 1944) (same); Protestant Episcopal
Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 91−92 (S.C. 2017) (applying neutral
principles to the real property dispute, but not to the trademark dispute).
318. See supra notes 253−255 and accompanying text (discussing how neutral
principles would prevent courts from delving into an ecclesiastical trademark
dispute).
319. See Simon, supra note 135, at 312 (stating that churches turn to
trademark law “because there is no other mechanism to adequately protect their
identities”).
320. See McGill, 617 F.3d at 408 (finding the defendant arguing that “the
district court could not apply neutral principles of trademark law without
resolving an underlying doctrinal dispute: to wit, who are the ‘true’ Seventh-day
Adventists”).
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the church faction precluded from trademark use is left with no
name. 321
While the neutral principles approach is not perfect, it is the
framework courts have at their current disposal. Until the
Supreme Court clarifies the proper analysis for intra-church
trademark disputes, courts should apply neutral principles on a
consistent basis to all church property suits.

321. See id. at 415−16 (awarding summary judgment and leaving the
defendant’s church without use of its former name).

